ethrd
/ethrd1115
Channel to discuss Ethereum R&D topics
If anyone wants to be invited to this channel let me know!
Writing about proposer commitments and what they mean for Ethereum in the present and future.
Publishing tomorrow
Publishing tomorrow
It seems like the main quandary (in my view) with Multiple Concurrent Proposers is whatever the 'combining rule' turns out to be. It's very easy to design a rule that rewards pools with a high percentage of the validator set non-linearly, it's hard to design a rule that doesn't do this without trivially devolving back into single proposer.
At this point MCP looks more like a solution seeking a problem, having to wait 12 seconds until the next slot is actually fine when the only real decentralized competition (Bitcoin) makes you wait 10 minutes. Change my view?
At this point MCP looks more like a solution seeking a problem, having to wait 12 seconds until the next slot is actually fine when the only real decentralized competition (Bitcoin) makes you wait 10 minutes. Change my view?
Vorbit SSF with circular and spiral finality: validator selection and distribution
This post analyzes how cumulative finality accrues across committees in single-slot finality (SSF) for a wide range of validator sets, with a key focus on committee design.
https://ethresear.ch/t/vorbit-ssf-with-circular-and-spiral-finality-validator-selection-and-distribution/20464
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This post analyzes how cumulative finality accrues across committees in single-slot finality (SSF) for a wide range of validator sets, with a key focus on committee design.
https://ethresear.ch/t/vorbit-ssf-with-circular-and-spiral-finality-validator-selection-and-distribution/20464
✍️
Fyi @scrollzkp has been putting out weekly talks about various research topics and they're fantastic. Here's the playlist on youtube 👇
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_MnTlZDkoI&list=PLrzRr7okCcmZr9GHM595Q9_BH482IjvQg
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_MnTlZDkoI&list=PLrzRr7okCcmZr9GHM595Q9_BH482IjvQg
Wrote a post on FOCIL resource considerations after reflecting on how clients might implement it. We outlined some concerns about potential bottlenecks, hoping to spark more discussions to move it toward the spec realization phase. Feedback welcome! https://ethresear.ch/t/focil-resource-design-considerations/20457
Kinda wondering whether synchronous based rollups via SUAVE is a candidate solution for Ethereum based sequencing goals?
Functionally it meets the criteria of enabling L1 proposer sequencing for rollups (potentially multiple in service of synchronous composability). But lacks baked in preconfirmation functionality afaict
Functionally it meets the criteria of enabling L1 proposer sequencing for rollups (potentially multiple in service of synchronous composability). But lacks baked in preconfirmation functionality afaict
Just published a piece with Christoph which frames all of the research going into “propsing rights allocation” (i.e. ePBS, APS, ET etc)
There are a bunch of designs, posts and papers but its not always clear how it all relates to each other. We try to clarify that
Some opinions and open questions also included
https://collective.flashbots.net/t/isolating-attesters-from-mev/3837?u=quintus
There are a bunch of designs, posts and papers but its not always clear how it all relates to each other. We try to clarify that
Some opinions and open questions also included
https://collective.flashbots.net/t/isolating-attesters-from-mev/3837?u=quintus
New litepaper from Spire all about based rollups!
https://github.com/spire-labs/litepaper/blob/main/The%20Based%20Stack%20by%20Spire%20Labs%20-%20Litepaper.pdf
https://github.com/spire-labs/litepaper/blob/main/The%20Based%20Stack%20by%20Spire%20Labs%20-%20Litepaper.pdf
https://ethresear.ch/t/the-shape-of-issuance-curves-to-come/20405
In this post I delve into why and how we should consider tweaking the issuance curve. To prevent ever-growing stake rates that would cause centralization issues to the validator set. In summary, the proposal is to introduce:
- A tweak to the issuance curve so that issuance can go negative at high stake rates.
- Uncorrelation incentives like those proposed by @vitalik.eth and nerolation.
Hope it peaks your interest, feel free to chime in and discuss.
In this post I delve into why and how we should consider tweaking the issuance curve. To prevent ever-growing stake rates that would cause centralization issues to the validator set. In summary, the proposal is to introduce:
- A tweak to the issuance curve so that issuance can go negative at high stake rates.
- Uncorrelation incentives like those proposed by @vitalik.eth and nerolation.
Hope it peaks your interest, feel free to chime in and discuss.
This Week's Research & Education
-frankmint2024 proposed EIP-7766
-0xwels introduced CCTP Express
@yashasedu shares MegaETH 101
-ddimitrovv22 published ”Programming ZKPs: From Zero to Hero”
https://web3builder.news/research-and-education-09-02-24/
-frankmint2024 proposed EIP-7766
-0xwels introduced CCTP Express
@yashasedu shares MegaETH 101
-ddimitrovv22 published ”Programming ZKPs: From Zero to Hero”
https://web3builder.news/research-and-education-09-02-24/
This is fantastic article on app self-sequencing.
At the end of the day DApps need to bundle to help provide their users with more efficient outcomes and I really do believe this would be the best way to manage L1 blockspace for welfare.
It makes me wonder whether bundles should be an abstracted fee market. Under the hood, we still have vectorization of computational resource usage patterns (which are far more granular), but when it comes to fee markets we could potentially have "CR blockspace" as well as bundle blockspace.
I havn't really thought about it long enough, but there are diamonds in the rough in this article that are making me think more about our approach
lu-ban.notion.site/From-Self-sequ…
At the end of the day DApps need to bundle to help provide their users with more efficient outcomes and I really do believe this would be the best way to manage L1 blockspace for welfare.
It makes me wonder whether bundles should be an abstracted fee market. Under the hood, we still have vectorization of computational resource usage patterns (which are far more granular), but when it comes to fee markets we could potentially have "CR blockspace" as well as bundle blockspace.
I havn't really thought about it long enough, but there are diamonds in the rough in this article that are making me think more about our approach
lu-ban.notion.site/From-Self-sequ…
wen focil
This is a false statement. It will replace SMR, not decentralized consensus which relies upon stake-weighted bonds and consensus rewards to enforce fork-choice logic.
ZK is not magic that replaces everything
https://x.com/kapursanat/status/1831940273636831370
ZK is not magic that replaces everything
https://x.com/kapursanat/status/1831940273636831370
Summarized notes I made from the Ethereum AMA regarding progress within cryptography and upgrades depending on work here 👇:
Covers developments with ZK and VDFs and where they fit into the roadmap.
Covers developments with ZK and VDFs and where they fit into the roadmap.
The 12th Ethereum Foundation Research Reddit AMA just started!
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1f81ntr/ama_we_are_ef_research_pt_12_05_september_2024/
https://www.reddit.com/r/ethereum/comments/1f81ntr/ama_we_are_ef_research_pt_12_05_september_2024/
A Twitter article I wrote giving my opinion on how the Ethereum roadmap should be structured and the tangible deliverables that contribute towards reaching milestones:
https://x.com/markodayan/status/1831348173413212548?t=RIbroqdzF7K_SxLltQ7AYg&s=19
https://x.com/markodayan/status/1831348173413212548?t=RIbroqdzF7K_SxLltQ7AYg&s=19
1/
EIP-1559 is a very misunderstood upgrade. While many know that it was an upgrade made to Ethereum’s transaction fee mechanism, many of the benefits are not well understood.
It is our goal with this article to present you with the facts around what EIP-1559 is about, what it was designed to solve, and how we made it work 🧵
research.2077.xyz/eip-1559-separ…
EIP-1559 is a very misunderstood upgrade. While many know that it was an upgrade made to Ethereum’s transaction fee mechanism, many of the benefits are not well understood.
It is our goal with this article to present you with the facts around what EIP-1559 is about, what it was designed to solve, and how we made it work 🧵
research.2077.xyz/eip-1559-separ…
ePBS breakout #8 notes: https://hackmd.io/@ttsao/epbs-breakout-8
Moving to slot auctions seems imminent at this point, the question is when. If we want to have slot auctions for the very first client devnet, then the sooner the better
Moving to slot auctions seems imminent at this point, the question is when. If we want to have slot auctions for the very first client devnet, then the sooner the better
This Week’s Research updates
@tjbecker.eth analyzes security of Bitcoin L2 project architectures
@theblock published research on ACP-77
Nero.eth published “On Proposer Timing Games and Economies of Scale”
@mikeneuder published “Mechan-stein (alt. Franken-ism)”
Click below for details👇
https://www.web3builder.news/web3-builder-news-08-19-24/
@tjbecker.eth analyzes security of Bitcoin L2 project architectures
@theblock published research on ACP-77
Nero.eth published “On Proposer Timing Games and Economies of Scale”
@mikeneuder published “Mechan-stein (alt. Franken-ism)”
Click below for details👇
https://www.web3builder.news/web3-builder-news-08-19-24/
🧩 On multi-proposer gadgets and protocols 🧩
I wrote this small note on the different multi-proposer designs and philosophies behind gadgets like FOCIL🦴 and protocols like BRAID🪢.
tldr: FOCIL can be thought of as gadget, or an add-on to the existing Ethereum protocol. It is focused on leveraging multiple validators to improve the network’s censorship resistance properties, but is minimally interfering with the current block market structure.
BRAID has a much broader scope, as it aims not only to improve CR but also to 'solve' MEV by trying to prevent any one proposer from having a privileged role or special advantage over others. This involves building a protocol from the ground up, with a new consensus mechanism, as well as significant changes to the execution layer (e.g., ordering rule), and market structure.
Here’s the link to the post: https://hackmd.io/xz1UyksETR-pCsazePMAjw
I wrote this small note on the different multi-proposer designs and philosophies behind gadgets like FOCIL🦴 and protocols like BRAID🪢.
tldr: FOCIL can be thought of as gadget, or an add-on to the existing Ethereum protocol. It is focused on leveraging multiple validators to improve the network’s censorship resistance properties, but is minimally interfering with the current block market structure.
BRAID has a much broader scope, as it aims not only to improve CR but also to 'solve' MEV by trying to prevent any one proposer from having a privileged role or special advantage over others. This involves building a protocol from the ground up, with a new consensus mechanism, as well as significant changes to the execution layer (e.g., ordering rule), and market structure.
Here’s the link to the post: https://hackmd.io/xz1UyksETR-pCsazePMAjw
Enjoy our latest dive comparing parallel execution models in blockchains.
Sealevel (@solana) vs BlockSTM (Aptos, Sui)
https://research.2077.xyz/block-stm-vs-sealevel-1
Sealevel (@solana) vs BlockSTM (Aptos, Sui)
https://research.2077.xyz/block-stm-vs-sealevel-1