253227
Quintus

@quintus #253227

Flashbot
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I tried farcaster/warpcast for a bit earlier this year but didn’t really get into it. I get the sense that I didn’t figure out channels and frames that well

What’s the best way to use this app?
I’ve been looking at what it would take to build TEEs with much better security assumptions (and much greater success at being secure within those assumptions)

This podcast gives a great overview of why one would even want to do this and how

Accompanying blogpost: https://writings.flashbots.net/ZTEE2-Supply-Chains
Cheslin’s got that dawg in him
Just published a piece with Christoph which frames all of the research going into “propsing rights allocation” (i.e. ePBS, APS, ET etc)

There are a bunch of designs, posts and papers but its not always clear how it all relates to each other. We try to clarify that

Some opinions and open questions also included

https://collective.flashbots.net/t/isolating-attesters-from-mev/3837?u=quintus
The recent bok victories are so much more satisfying when you take into account the new players and strategies we’re trialing
All blacks irl are smaller than I expected

Tbf they do have to run a lot
Nice new post from Christoph Schlegel at Flashbots

tl;dr: APS designs with an inelastic supply of "proposing rights" lead to more market concentration than elastic supply

I.e. having a fixed number of exec tickets likely leads-to-winner-takes-all unlike systems that resemble PoS in which people can stake as much as they like

This is one of a number of recent pieces that have been narrowing down the design space for Ethereum’s proposing rights allocation (APS, ePBS etc)

https://collective.flashbots.net/t/inelastic-vs-elastic-supply-why-proof-of-stake-could-be-less-centralizing-than-execution-tickets/3816?u=quintus
In case anyone's missed it, here's intel's response to the recent claimed vuln
tl;dr: Seems theres a bunch of reasons not to worry about this specific "vuln"

Ofc the broader point that TEE-based systems should be designed in anticipation of failures is still valid

https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/announcement/intel-security-announcement-2024-08-29-001.html
I guess the great thing about farcaster is that I can shitpost and feel like Im contributing to a greater cause
Can’t tell if “wallet” is a terrible name for the software users use to control their keys because its so much more than moving and custodying funds

Or if its a great name because it frames more of our identity snd the information we put out into the world as valuable
If your boss offered you a promotion in exchange for sexual favours

would that be bad practice because he has your career branching on secret bits?

(This is a joke to clear)
Calling HR - everyone in this office is talking about their secret bits
Beware the focus ion beam
No one loves acronyms more than Intel
What are the important differences between execution tickets and have a new class of stakers who get paid only for proposing blocks?

Both see people depositing capital and then random selection weighted by deposit

Is the primary diff is that tickets are tradeable?
Alignment has been achieved internally
Been thinking about things in this direction with execution ticket conversations heating up

https://m.youtube.com/watch?si=ECRd8DCMOC9Ewzn5&v=XYg_0rt9pv8&feature=youtu.be
Maybe I missed the discussion on this but it feels like one underrated benefit of ET is that you’re probably reducing the number of individual parties that can cause a liveness fault (from proposer & bb to only bb)

(Those who believe ET will still be filled by sth like the PBS market on Ethereum will disagree)
Thank god for version arrays
In the exec tickets design, do beacon blocks play any roles other than:
* propagating attestations
* inclusion lists

Would it be feasible to completely leave them out? (hypothetical just to understand consensus implications)

Cc: @mikeneuder.eth @fradamt
Shill me you execution tickets takes

I’m compiling something